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Abstract
In November 2015, after weeks of bitter political rhetoric and much discussion about the consequences of the proposed 
changes, the UK Tory government reversed their decision to eliminate tax credits for the poorest. While much was made of 
this reversal, particularly who deserved responsibility for the change, a more subtle politics was going on behind the scenes. 
The primary justification for the reversal, given by the Chancellor George Osborne, was that tax revenues in forthcoming 
years were now expected to be much higher than before. Yet, a deeper look into this justification revealed that 55% of those 
extra revenues (£29.1 billion out of £52.2 billion) came from “modelling changes”. Suddenly, the discursive sparring over 
tax revenues found its material embodiment in the computers of the Office for Budget Responsibility. Similarly, central bank 
policies have become essential to the global economy since the 2008 crisis, and their policies concerning interest rates and 
quantitative easing are the joint product of hybrid human–computer systems. Yet, while scholars have examined the influ-
ence of modelling technology on derivatives valuation models, the field of central bank macroeconomic modelling has been 
largely ignored. This paper will examine these government economic models, outlining a broad history of their changing 
political ramifications. What are these models? How can they change the possibilities of government action so much? In 
addition, what effect do they have on politicians? Do they function merely as post-hoc justification for policies, or do they 
give shape to the space of the politically possible? The aim of this project is to begin answering these questions and generate 
a framework for understanding how economic modelling is shaping and interacting with economic policy.
Keywords Macroeconomic models · Central banks · Sociotechnical reasoning · Extended cognition · Sociology of 
knowledge
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models 
joined to the art of choosing models that are relevant 
to the contemporary world.
-John Maynard Keynes, 1938
1 Introduction
In November 2015, after weeks of bitter political rhetoric 
and much discussion, the UK’s Conservative government 
reversed their decision to eliminate tax credits for the poor-
est. While much was made of this reversal and struggles 
fought over who deserved responsibility for the change, a 
more subtle politics was going on behind the scenes. In justi-
fying the u-turn, the primary reason given by the Chancellor 
George Osborne was that tax revenues in forthcoming years 
were now expected to be much higher than before. Yet, a 
deeper look into this justification revealed that 55% of those 
extra revenues (£29.1 billion out of £52.2 billion) came from 
“modelling changes”. Suddenly, the discursive sparring over 
tax revenues found its material embodiment in the comput-
ers of the Office for Budget Responsibility. Such macroeco-
nomic models are pervasive in economic policy-making, and 
just as influential as this small example would suggest. Yet, 
this has remained a largely unexplored area, despite its sig-
nificance and despite attention being paid to similar models 
in financial markets.1
The aim of this paper is to undertake a preliminary 
investigation into central bank macroeconomic modelling 
as a key site of sociotechnical reasoning: where technology 
and cognition intermingle in close and crucial ways. Cen-
tral banks form an important point, where ‘cognition in the 
wild’ takes place (Hutchins 1995) and provide a rich context 
for thinking through the relationships between machines, 
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reasoning processes, and the production of governability. 
This is not least, because, increasingly, central banks are 
experimenting with unorthodox approaches to making the 
economy visible—using Google search data, for instance, 
or machine-learning algorithms. As AI techniques become 
adopted into central banks, they will be well-positioned to 
give us insights into how humans and machines can think 
together, and how the state will deploy these technologies to 
make the economy legible. I intend in future work to develop 
these ideas in more depth, but this piece will begin the pro-
ject by interrogating a major shift in central bank modelling 
in recent decades: the move from structural econometric 
models to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. This change, as I hope to show, has brought about an 
important shift in the epistemic influence of models on the 
reasoning process that determines monetary policy-making.
The first section will examine some of the literature rel-
evant to the discussion of sociotechnical reasoning within 
central banks. While very little research has been done on 
this specific topic, Mary Morgan’s work in particular can 
help us consider how thinking with models works in this 
context. Whereas her work has focused on the academic 
use of models, this piece is aimed at the policymaker use 
models. The second section will outline how central banks 
deploy models as part of a larger sociotechnical reasoning 
process involving communities of experts and ecosystems of 
models. It will attempt to show how forecasting uses models 
as anchor points, while policy analysis uses them as artifi-
cial laboratories. The third section will then look at how the 
types of models have changed in central banks, focusing 
particularly on the most recent period when DSGE models 
became dominant. Finally, the penultimate section will show 
how this shift has brought about a change in the epistemic 
influence of the models, and how this may help explain why 
central banks missed the 2007–2008 crises. In particular, 
DSGE models bring about a new emphasis on theoretical 
consistency, but as a result render unmodelled empirical data 
more obscure within the broader reasoning process.
2  Extending cognition
Central bank models have not yet been studied as a site of 
extended cognition and have only received specialist (i.e., 
policymaker) attention in most of economics,2 but a vari-
ety of literatures can help to gain a grasp on the dynamics 
at play. Most relevant here is the study of extended mind 
theory—an object of study that has been taken up in dif-
ferent ways by philosophy and sociology (Clark and Chal-
mers 2008; Menary 2010). We have already alluded to 
Edwin Hutchins’ work on ship navigation, where he exam-
ines cognition as something that happens across technical 
tools and collectives. Yet, similar approaches can be found 
in Ronald Giere’s analysis of the Hubble telescope; (Giere 
2006, Chap. 3) William Clancey’s work on the Mars rovers; 
(Clancey 2012) and Karin Knorr Cetina’s examination of 
particle accelerators (Cetina 1999). In all of these cases, 
distributed cognition carries out various processes—it cre-
ates perceptions (as in the Hubble telescope example), it 
carries out research (as in the Mars rover example), and it 
coordinates large technical systems (as in the ship navigation 
example). As Mary Morgan’s work shows, with the use of 
models, distributed cognition comes to take on a function 
of reasoning.
Models, at their most basic, are a making explicit of 
implicit intuitions and hunches. They operate by combining 
various elements together in a partially flexible way—they 
link together analytical definitions, empirical regularities, 
local contexts, universal principles, disciplinary laws, and 
concepts into some sort of consistent whole (Morgan 2012, 
80). While contemporary economics primarily concerns 
itself with mathematical models, they have also historically 
taken the form of visual diagrams (such as the Tableau 
Économique drawn by François Quesnay), ideal-type mod-
els (such as David Ricardo’s model farm), physical models 
(such as Bill Phillips’ hydraulic model), and computational 
models (such as the Federal Reserve’s large-scale FRB/US 
model). Any given model is constituted (and constrained) by 
two sets of rules for manipulation (Morgan 2012, 26–27). 
First, the rules of the material are determined by the matter 
making up the model, whether physical (e.g., models that 
attempt to build scale replicas of the phenomenon in ques-
tion) or ideational (e.g., models built in algebraic language 
or a particular computer language). In both cases, one is 
bound by the rules of how one can manipulate such material. 
The second broad constraint is the rules of the subject matter 
itself—the theoretical concepts and their interrelations that 
the model builders have implemented into the technology. 
In macroeconomic modelling, both have channelled think-
ing about economics down particular paths. The limits of 
computation, for instance, have led to economics focusing 
more on stable linear relationships, rather than destabilising 
non-linear relationships (Buiter 2009). Likewise, the focus 
of contemporary economic theory on market-clearing has 
led to a general avoidance of the question of involuntary 
unemployment and disequilibrium more generally.
A consequence of the two sets of rules imposed by model-
ling is that they create a set of interrelations, and therefore, 
one can have a precise pathway for following a chain of 
2 There is a small, but growing literature on central banks from the 
sociology of economics. These have focused more on communica-
tion and the role of economics education, rather than technology. See: 
(Abolafia and Hatmaker 2013; Abolafia 2004, 2010; Braun 2014, 
2016; Fligstein et al. 2014; Holmes 2013).
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consequences. On the basis of this, what gives contemporary 
computational models their peculiar power is their capacity 
not only to organise but also to outsource cognition. While 
organising cognition can be a virtue in itself (for example, 
double-entry bookkeeping), within models, the rules of the 
model are outsourced into a computational medium that ena-
bles them to step-by-step delineate the consequences. With 
such a technology in hand, one can allow the calculative and 
inferential processes to expand far beyond any human capac-
ity. Models, therefore, solidify certain rules of thought, and 
this consolidation of a particular state of knowledge is the 
source of both their power and their limits.
In addition, models perform a certain function—namely, 
to convince. In this regard, their construction is also a means 
to transform a purely conceptual argument into a medium 
for propagation and persuasion. This is more than just the 
widely-known argument that numbers give an illusion of 
certainty and precision. The point is rather that the very 
path of reasoning is altered and made more palatable (or 
not) depending on the medium through which it is made. To 
give an example, Morgan recounts David Ricardo’s efforts 
to argue with Thomas Malthus about the potential for eco-
nomic stagnation (Morgan 2012, Chap. 2). Through the use 
of narrative and table-based reasoning, Ricardo consist-
ently failed to make his case. However, the creation of a 
model farm linked together by reasoning based on account-
ing principles formed a key role in persuasively making his 
argument. A more recent example can be found in central 
banks’ use of simple(r) models (such as overlapping genera-
tions models) to communicate with policymakers and the 
public. The vagaries of more complex models can distract 
or obscure the essential aspects, while simpler models can 
enable them to focus on the pertinent economic relationships 
and render them more persuasive. Models must be seen as 
intimately social, rather than a purely neutral expression of 
objective features.
Therefore, the point to be taken from Morgan’s work is 
that models condense a set of inferential and material rules 
into a medium that also alters the persuasiveness of the rea-
soning. Their ability to deduce the consequences of long 
chains of inference makes them powerful tools for under-
standing complex and interconnected systems. As such, it 
is no surprise to them gain significant traction (and finan-
cial backing) within central banks and their effort to make 
the economy intellectually tractable. The economy (along 
with nature) is one of the preeminent complex systems of 
the modern world, and models are essential to render them 
intelligible.
3  Sociotechnical reasoning
While Morgan’s sensitive and patient reconstruction of 
model use throughout the history of economics is illu-
minating in many ways, it remains focused on academic 
economists. When we turn to central banks, it remains to be 
seen whether models are used in the same ways, or whether 
policy-making circles deploy models in their own unique 
manner.3 The argument here is that there are a number of 
key differences between academic and policymaker use of 
models, and the aim of this section is to outline some of 
these differences. In what follows, I try to answer this ques-
tion by drawing upon evidence from the Riksbank, the Bank 
of England, and the Federal Reserve, since they are among 
the most transparent of central banks. They are also, in many 
ways, leading innovators within the field and provide a good 
basis for understanding best practice.
How, then, do central banks think and how do they use 
models within this process? In their everyday dealings, 
central banks undertake a variety of tasks ranging from 
overseeing the payments system, regulating banks, collect-
ing statistics, and of course, deciding on monetary policy. 
It is the latter aspect which will interest us here, as it is 
the site in which computational modelling and political 
decision-making most closely intertwine. In examining this 
decision-making system, it is impossible to locate the pro-
cess of reasoning in either a specific individual or a specific 
model. Instead, the process behind monetary policy deci-
sions involves a sociotechnical reasoning system that spans 
across humans and technologies (Hutchins 1995, Chap. 9). 
In the first place, monetary policy decisions are typically 
(with New Zealand being a notable exception) made by com-
mittee rather than by an individual. Research has shown that 
the group structure of monetary policy committees leads to a 
variety of epistemic tendencies (such as a propensity towards 
policy inertia) (Blinder and Wyplosz 2005). This means that 
the assumption of central bank decisions being made by a 
single agent misses the committee form and the deliberative 
and sociological dynamics that go on within them. Policy 
decisions are community decisions.
Equally important are the interactions between human 
and nonhuman modes of reasoning. In their interaction with 
models, for instance, subjective judgments are often used to 
supplement forecasts with short term and new information 
that is yet to be aggregated into the traditional statistical 
measures like the national income product accounts (Sims 
2002, 21; Fawcett et al. 2015; Rosenberg 2008, 4). The Bank 
3 The argument here will be focused on the broad category of 
DSGE modelling, as the most recent and influential approach—but 
future research intends to take into account the alternative modelling 
approaches as well.
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of England, for instance, incorporates more frequent infor-
mation (such as business surveys and other leading indica-
tors) via the judgment of members of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, rather than directly through the core model itself 
(Hatch 2001, 140). Likewise, the Federal Reserve relies on 
sector experts to provide subjective forecasts, sometimes as 
inputs into the core model (Sims 2002, 4). In addition, the 
Riksbank has begun carrying out company surveys to get 
more real-time information about the state of the economy, 
which is then fed into the core forecasting effort (Rosen-
berg 2008, 4). DSGE models require parameterisation—the 
setting of certain variables. The parameters are usually set 
by historical data (along with the uncertainty range of the 
parameter). However, key information is also derived from 
expertise, microeconomic research, and Bayesian statis-
tics (Dotsey 2013, 12). Therefore, human reasoning has an 
important role to play here as well; model-based reasoning 
is ultimately inseparable from a larger sociotechnical form 
of reasoning.
Turning to the computational modelling side, central 
banks deploy models for a variety of functions and, there-
fore, rely upon an ecosystem of different models. This is 
particularly important, since no single model is a perfect 
representation and there is model uncertainty. In part, this 
uncertainty is minimised using multiple models—similar 
to the recent shift to ensemble modelling in the climate 
change sector (Collins 2007). If models agree on the impli-
cations of a shift, then it can be considered that there is 
little uncertainty, and vice versa.4 Within this ecosystem, 
a first type of model is sectoral models, which are typi-
cally small though very detailed, and used to explore areas 
in more depth. Oftentimes, they are based heavily on the 
knowledge of sectoral experts who attempt to map the model 
as closely as possible to the data. A second type occurs with 
experimental models, which are used to test and introduce 
new innovations. At the Federal Reserve, for example, these 
models are used “for proto-typing specifications and struc-
tures that would be too difficult and expensive to incorporate 
in [the core] FRB/US without a reasonable sense that such 
alterations are warranted and useful.” (Stockton 2003, 9) 
One can think of these models as exploratory probes that 
test out new intuitions of the modellers. Third, a variety 
of cross-check models can act as a test on the results of the 
core model. They may be simple models designed to ensure 
key intuitions about the economy are upheld, or more com-
plex ones designed to track the data as closely as possible. 
Finally, the most prominent type is what is known as core 
models—large-scale, all-encompassing models that attempt 
to represent the entire economy and provide the foundation 
for discussions.
It is these core models which we will focus on for the 
remainder of the article. These core models are used for 
two key tasks (though there are others as well): forecasting 
and policy analysis. In the first instance, models are used 
to offer predictions about where the economy as a whole is 
going (Sims 2002, 2; Stockton 2003, 9–10), as indicated by 
key variables like inflation, broad risks, the financial sec-
tor, the international context, and the domestic economy 
(Rosenberg 2008, 5–6). These forecasts are produced in an 
iterative manner over the span of a number of meetings, 
but modelling remains central to all of them, and “in recent 
years, models have played an increasingly important role in 
the work on forecasts” (Hallsten and Tägtström 2009, 73; 
Hatch 2001). Models are particularly significant in forecast-
ing long-term trends, because human expertise weakens over 
long-term projections, while models can maintain the inter-
dependent inferential connections between elements of the 
economy (Sims 2002, 21). On the level of reasoning, fore-
casting involves channelling particular intuitions and infer-
ences about the relationships between economic variables 
down a set path. This is one aspect that distinguishes them 
from human reasoning, in their capacity to extend inferen-
tial chains to a much more expansive range than the human 
mind is capable of. Morgan’s image of models as comprised 
of two sets of rules is most prominent in this function, par-
ticularly as models extend what might be intuitions that can 
be embodied in expert judgment into long-term forecasts 
that reach far beyond human capacities alone. This unique 
reasoning capacity means that models act as anchor points 
around which discussion centres (Stockton 2003). In the 
Riksbank, for instance, the overall forecast provides the 
baseline from which sectoral experts can then go and sub-
stantiate the conclusions in more detail (Rosenberg 2008, 3).
The second function of core models—policy analysis—
also looks into the future, but does so by modifying various 
elements of the model in an attempt to simulate the effects 
of policy interventions. Under these circumstances, as the 
former central banker Alan Blinder notes, “some kind of 
model—however informal—is necessary to do policy, for 
otherwise how can you even begin to estimate the effects 
of changes in policy instruments?” (Blinder 1998, 7). Rela-
tively theory-free models (such as vector autoregression) 
simply attempt to generate equations that fit the historical 
data, and predict a future based upon that. Yet, in testing 
out policy alternatives, these models fail, since they have 
no place for theoretical considerations about how monetary 
policy may affect the economy (Adolfson et al. 2007, 113). 
In other words, they excel at extrapolating from existing 
trends, but falter when those conditions shift due to policy 
decisions. At this point, models based more on theory, like 
4 Though this problematically depends on how closely aligned the 
models are to begin with—models sharing the same basic assump-
tions about marginal utility or general equilibrium, for instance, are 
already predisposed to producing similar outcomes.
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DSGE models, become essential. Models are deployed here 
more as artificial laboratories rather than as extrapolations 
of existing trends. This function most closely approximates 
the academic’s use of models, as they both deploy models as 
artificial worlds within which the users can manipulate and 
create experiments (Morgan 2012, Chap. 7). For instance, 
both academics and policymakers may ask questions about 
what happens to the economy if interest rates are maintained 
instead of raised, or what happens if government bonds are 
purchased in open market operations. In any case, for policy-
makers, models are essential due to the ways in which they 
provide a consistent framework for understanding possible 
outcomes.
4  A history of macroeconomic modelling 
in central banks
Maintaining the focus on core models, this section will 
present a schematic history of central bank models to draw 
out a significant shift in central bank modelling that has 
occurred in the past 20 years. Broadly speaking, there has 
been a move from more ad hoc and empirically-oriented 
models to more theoretically consistent and abstract models. 
As we will see in the next section, this change has had an 
impact on how central banks think with models, and how 
knowledge is produced.
The history of modelling within central banks begins in 
parallel to the history of academic macroeconomics. As a 
discipline, macroeconomics is widely seen as emerging with 
Keynes’ work in the 1930s, particularly his treatise The Gen-
eral Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (Keynes 
2007). With this text, Keynes separated out the study of mac-
roeconomics from microeconomics, and research became 
focused on the aggregate entities that comprised the macro-
economy. Keynes’ own work, however, is difficult and it is 
unlikely that it would have gained nearly as much traction if 
not for his successors producing a simplified formal model 
of some of Keynes’ insights (though, crucially, leaving out 
many of his key ideas and forcing his system into a general 
equilibrium framework). Particularly significant here was the 
IS-LM model formulated by John Hicks in 1937, which gave 
Keynes’ ideas about the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary 
policy a clear, albeit simplified, framework.5 At the same 
time, the first formalised models of the economy were being 
built by the Dutch modeller Jan Tinbergen (Tinbergen 1939). 
Based upon Keynes’ ideas and consisting of 32 stochastic 
equations, this original model was already oriented towards 
policy—having been designed to answer whether the Dutch 
central bank should leave the gold standard and devalue their 
currency (a decision was eventually taken to devalue, in line 
with the model’s simulated suggestions) (Taylor 2016, 2–3).
These two origins—Keynes as the conceptual frame-
work for understanding the macroeconomy, combined 
with the econometric work necessary to estimate values 
for the parameters of the model—would eventually merge 
into the macroeconomic consensus of the 1950s and guide 
central banks and academics during the so-called golden 
age of capitalism (Glyn et al. 1990). Yet, the calculations 
involved were laborious and modelling remained peripheral 
to monetary policy-making decisions in the early decades. 
In the early 1960s, for example, the Bank of Canada would 
routinely send boxes of computer cards to a nearby com-
puter centre to be processed overnight by teams of work-
ers, to have them returned in the morning with the solutions 
(Helliwell 2005, 30). Much like climate change modelling, 
macroeconomic modelling emerged into its own in the late 
1960s with the increasing prevalence and power of computer 
technology (Pescatori and Zaman 2011; Evans 1999, 14). 
The Federal Reserve’s first major model—the MPS6—began 
operating in 1970, and contained about 60 behavioural equa-
tions in its initial form (Brayton et al. 1997, 2). This model 
represented the economy through the IS-LM approach, and 
was explicitly designed to provide a conceptual platform 
for the government to stabilise the economy. It was, in other 
words, consciously designed as a tool to manipulate the 
economy. In line with the dominant theoretical and political 
perspective of the time, the model focused heavily on fis-
cal policy levers. Monetary policy played only a small role, 
effectively operating on short-term interest rates (Brayton 
et al. 1997, 3).
For both real-world and conceptual reasons, this consen-
sus fell apart in the 1970s. The stagflation (i.e., high unem-
ployment combined with high inflation) of the decade was 
supposed to be impossible in the IS-LM framework that 
included a Phillips curve which saw a trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. From the academic side, the 
consensus was attacked by a number of criticisms centred 
around the model’s macroeconomic assumptions. Crucial 
here was Robert Lucas’s critique that took to task the inabil-
ity of the models to change in response to changes in the 
policy environment (Lucas 1976). The models of the time 
derived their parameters from the past data under a given 
policy regime, but this was insufficient to predict what would 
happen under alternative policy regimes. What was needed, 
5 IS-LM stands for investment savings and liquidity preference-
money supply. Franco Modigliani would go on to add further nuances 
to what became the standard IS-LM model. (Hicks 1937; Modigliani 
1944.)
6 The MPS is named after the affiliations of those who built it—Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania, and 
the Social Science Research Council.
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argued Lucas, was an understanding of the deep founda-
tions of the economy—which he argued were the optimising 
behaviour of individual agents—rather than the macroeco-
nomic aggregate outcomes. If models were to be effective 
at policy analysis, they would have to be ‘microfounded’ on 
such individual agents.
Lucas’ alternative approach came to be known as the 
DSGE revolution, or the ‘rational expectations’ revolu-
tion—so-called for the assumption that the agents of the 
model would have model-consistent expectations about the 
future. In this approach, supply and demand always reach 
equilibrium in every market, and individual agents always 
optimise their plans given their constraints and the economic 
environment. Importantly for our purposes, the implemen-
tation of these models also ran into technological hurdles 
and required a series of simplifying assumptions to become 
computationally tractable. Yet, as the former President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis notes, the fact 
that these models were simplified in such a way as to make 
government action ineffective appears “almost coincidental” 
(Kocherlakota 2010, 10–11). Technological constraints, in 
other words, justified a political choice about the value of 
free market economics in these models. Similar issues con-
cerning technological limits also meant that these models 
adopted ‘representative agents’. Unable to compute multi-
ple heterogeneous agents across the economy, these models 
took a single average agent to represent households, firms, 
and governments. This means that the interactions between 
households are, by design, absent from these models—a 
design choice which came to have major consequences dur-
ing the 2007–2008 crises, and which also meant that distri-
butional issues between agents were obscured.
Despite the rapid academic success of the DSGE revolu-
tion, surprisingly, it had little (immediate) effect on central 
bank modelling. As Andrea Pescatori and Saeed Zaman 
write,
The rational expectations revolution of the 1970s cre-
ated a temporary disconnect between academia and 
central banks. Economists at universities started work-
ing on developing a modelling framework that did not 
violate the Lucas critique. Monetary policymakers 
meanwhile continued to work with existing large-scale 
models since they were the only available framework 
for policy analysis (Pescatori and Zaman 2011).
Therefore, a divergence emerged between the policy 
models and the academic models.7 This divergence remains 
somewhat mysterious to this day, given the significance 
attached to Lucas’ critique for generating policy-relevant 
models. Without pretending to exhaust the explanation here 
(which will require going into the sociology of central bank 
members, and which future research aims to examine), we 
can suggest two initial reasons for this divergence. One 
reason was that the first generation of DSGE models was 
notable for concluding that government policy was impotent 
(Sargent and Wallace 1975; Kydland and Prescott 1982). 
These models posited that the economy was “fundamen-
tally ungovernable” (Braun 2014, 63). As rational expec-
tations means that the agents of the model have the same 
knowledge of the model as the modeller, any changes in 
government policy would also be immediately understand-
able by the agents. For example, increased spending by gov-
ernment today will be seen as causing increased taxes in 
the future—therefore, negating the effects. Or an increase 
in the money supply today will mean increased inflation in 
the future—also negating the attempted stimulative effects. 
If the model predicts that policymaker actions are useless, it 
is no surprise that policymakers were not exactly clamour-
ing to take them on board. A second major reason for the 
delayed uptake by central banks was that the forecasting 
record for these models was poor and policymakers pre-
ferred models that tracked the data more reliably, even if 
at the cost of theoretical consistency (Edge and Gürkaynak 
2010; Gürkaynak et al. 2013). As highly abstract and highly 
theoretical tools, these models did not offer much help in the 
crucial task of forecasting.
Both these problems began to dissipate as economists 
continued to develop what became known as New Keynes-
ian, or second-generation, DSGE models. These models (re)
introduced price and wage rigidities into the system which 
meant that equilibrium was no longer immediately attain-
able. As a result, monetary and fiscal policy could have sig-
nificant effects on the real economy in the short-run, even 
if much of this would disappear as the economy returned to 
equilibrium in the long run. The now standard Smets–Wout-
ers model also minimised the second problem by introduc-
ing Bayesian estimation to DSGE modelling (Smets and 
Wouters 2003, 2007). With these new techniques, Smets 
and Wouters produced a DSGE model that was able to track 
the time series of data as well as more traditional models, 
making it an attractive candidate for forecasting and policy 
analysis. Their theory-centric nature also means that these 
models can be relatively easy to communicate with as their 
conclusions are readily translatable into economic concepts 
(as opposed to the pattern-matching of more econometric 
models which may or may not track established concepts) 
(Stockton 2003, 5). With their major hindrances overcome, 
and with the mathematics for DSGE modelling becoming 
more widely understood, the 2000s saw a major increase in 7 It is worth noting that DSGE models have, to this day, still not 
become widely used in the private sector—i.e. where one would 
expect a useful model to flourish. (Yglesias 2013.)
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their use by central banks.8 While some central banks still 
use large-scale macroeconometric models of the Keynesian 
variety as their core model, this has been rapidly changing 
over the past two decades as new DSGE models take over 
(Benes et al. 2009; Burgess et al. 2013; Christoffel et al. 
2008; Dorich et al. 2013; Smets and Wouters 2003).
5  Thinking with models
Central bank modelling has, therefore, seen a major shift 
from structural econometric models to DSGE models. It is 
this particular shift which is of interest to us here, given 
the prominence accorded to DSGE approaches prior to the 
2007–2008 financial crises. This penultimate section will 
proceed by emphasising the differences between classic 
structural macroeconometric modelling and DSGE model-
ling, and arguing that the latter have brought about a trans-
formation in how reasoning with models occurs in central 
banks. In particular, they have shifted the nature of con-
sistency within modelling and brought about a new type of 
obscurity within the reasoning process.
At the level of the reasoning process, models have a 
unique epistemic power compared to other knowledge-
producing devices (such as surveys, intuitions, or expert 
knowledge). Analytically, we can posit two polar opposite 
situations. On one hand, models could be taken as the truth 
and their forecasts accepted without change. In this case, the 
entire reasoning process would be embodied within them 
and we could plausibly eliminate central bankers as deci-
sion makers. On the other hand, models could have no more 
epistemic power than any other piece of information. In this 
situation, they would circulate as objects of reasoning, but 
not constitute anything beyond another data point. Neither 
situation accurately describes how models are engaged in 
practice though. Simply put, they act as reasoning devices 
that embody and inflect the inferences of monetary policy 
committees and outside data, and their outputs are accorded 
a certain authority because of this role. More than just infor-
mation collected from surveys or measurements, models are 
a tool to trace through the connections within an economy. 
At the same time, models are not mere deterministic out-
puts, as they contain the capacity to surprise their creators, 
as well as having subjective judgments included among 
their inputs.9 Moreover, as we have seen, their results are 
subject to interpretation and negotiation amongst monetary 
policymakers. In the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, 
and Riksbank, a private core forecast is produced early in 
the decision-making process, which then provides the start-
ing point for discussions about monetary policy (Stockton 
2003, 5; Rosenberg 2008, 8; Fawcett et al. 2015). From 
there, depending on the subjective beliefs of the individual 
committee members, this forecast is interpreted in various 
ways and eventually transformed into a final, public, fore-
cast. Within central banks, therefore, models are neither 
truth-producers nor data points. Their epistemic power is 
greater than other pieces of information. They act as loose 
framing devices: they set the initial parameters of discussion 
and form an anchor point around which other interpretations 
circulate.
With the shift to DSGE models, this epistemic power 
changes the dynamics of the broader sociotechnical rea-
soning process. Older models in the Keynesian structural 
macroeconometric lineage were more ad hoc and disjointed. 
The economy was broken up into sectors, and the equations 
were often solved individually—i.e., the outcomes of one 
sector would not necessarily affect other sectors. This ad 
hoc and looser structure meant that they could more closely 
match the data, giving them the flexibility to adapt and be 
moulded to the realities of the economy. Modellers aimed to 
be consistent with the data, and new features could be added 
on to bring about results that tracked the world. However, 
as we saw earlier, these models were subject to the Lucas 
critique, and eventually left behind by academic economists. 
By contrast, the newer DSGE models place a premium on 
theoretical consistency and are solved simultaneously. In 
practice, the result is that these models impose a discipline 
of consistency on the conclusions. This occurs internally, 
with models unable to produce contradictory conclusions. 
Their position as core models also means consistency is 
imposed externally, as they provide a framework that helps 
to synthesise conclusions from different sectoral experts and 
different models. A core model, for instance, may be used 
to ensure that inflation predictions align with exchange rate 
predictions—or that the components of GDP match up to the 
aggregate prediction for GDP. The shift from IS-LM-type 
models to DSGE models has, therefore, meant a shift from 
a parallelism between the model and the world to internal 
consistency within the model.
This emphasis on the consistency has the consequence 
that empirically relevant elements can fade into the 
8 A partial list of central bank DSGE models in use includes the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (EDO Model, SIGMA), 
the Federal Reserve of Chicago (Chicago Fed DSGE Model), the 
Federal Reserve of New York (FRBNY DSGE Model), the Federal 
Reserve of Philadelphia (PRISM), Norges Bank (NEMO), Sveriges 
Riksbank (RAMSES II), the Bank of England (COMPASS, BEQM), 
the European Central Bank (NAWM), the Bank of Canada (ToTEM), 
the Central Bank of Chile (MAS), Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(KITT), and the Central Bank of Peru (MEGA-D).
9 For Morgan’s distinction between being surprised by models and 
being confounded by laboratory experiments, see: (Morgan 2012, 
293–96).
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background. Older models were happy to adapt to the data, 
but DSGE models impose strict conditions on how new 
phenomenon can be included. With them, the rules of the 
model only allow for certain transformations to occur. Ele-
ments that are difficult to fit into its principles—e.g., the 
necessity to be microfounded—are simply left out, whereas 
with older models these could be added in an ad hoc, but 
more empirically accurate, way. We see here confirmation 
of Morgan’s thesis about the rules of models. They impose 
a particular language, and phenomenon only receive techni-
cal recognition if it can be written in that language (not only 
mathematical, but a specific set of conceptual assumptions). 
While earlier models allowed for much more flexibility in 
the construction of the model, newer DSGE types impose 
strict conditions. Economists may know why a model does 
not fit the data, but if it cannot be expressed in the language 
of the model (i.e., finding the appropriate equations), then it 
cannot be included. This is not to deny an awareness of ele-
ments that are missing in the models, but these newer mod-
els make it more difficult to appreciate phenomenon which 
are not written in their language and meet their standards of 
internal consistency. The errors of the model must instead 
be adjusted for by relying on the judgment of the user, rather 
than through the model. Importantly, given the centrality 
of core models as anchor points, this has arguably made 
it more difficult for unmodellable phenomenon to become 
salient in the sociotechnical reasoning process that guides 
monetary policy-making. Contradictory information from 
other sources must pass higher thresholds to become visible. 
If a central banker disagrees with the core model, they must 
articulate a justification (in the appropriate language) for 
their own divergence. By contrast, if the model produces a 
forecast in line with their own intuitions and political lean-
ings (e.g., whether they are dovish or hawkish about mon-
etary policy), they are in good epistemic standing with the 
model to back them.
Such obscuring can be insignificant during normal times, 
but it means that the build-up of crises can be missed—and 
this may help explain why warning signs about the economy 
were ignored prior to 2007–2008. Indeed, the case for blam-
ing DSGE models for the inability of policymakers to fore-
see the crisis has some significant expert support. William 
Buiter, a founding member of the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee for the Bank of England, has said that “The Bank of 
England in 2007 faced the onset of the credit crunch with too 
much Robert Lucas, Michael Woodford and Robert Merton 
[all key figures in the DSGE revolution] in its intellectual 
cupboard.” (Buiter 2009) The current Bank of England Chief 
Economist, Andy Haldane, cites the obscuring function of 
these models: saying that the neglect of financial bubbles 
lies in DSGE models; “because these models were built 
on real-business-cycle foundations, financial factors (asset 
prices, money, and credit) played distinctly second fiddle 
if they played a role at all.” (Haldane 2012) These are two 
well-informed and experienced policymakers laying sig-
nificant blame for the surprise of the crisis on the models 
that have come to dominate many central banks. Yet, oth-
ers have pointed out that these models were not the only 
source of information for policymakers, and that, therefore, 
blame cannot solely lie with them (Wren-Lewis 2012). The 
argument here is that central banks should have recognised 
the warning signs through other means, even if their core 
models prevented the key questions from even being asked. 
However, as we have just seen, the shift to DSGE models has 
introduced a new obscuring function, rendering unmodelled 
information as increasingly less visible. Supporting (though 
far from conclusive) evidence for this position arises from 
the fact that rising and risky levels of credit never featured 
in the Bank of England’s Inflation Reports leading up to the 
crisis (as late as August 2007, the risks to the economy were 
deemed to be balanced) (‘Inflation Report, August 2007’ 
2007). The alternative information that was available did 
not convince policymakers that a bubble was afoot or that 
financial interconnections may be a problem.10 The empha-
sis on consistency obscured those elements that could not 
be articulated within the rules of the model.
6  Conclusion
From this discussion, we can see that models form an impor-
tant factor in monetary policy decisions. Through forecast-
ing, core models provide an anchor point for discussion, and 
in policy analysis, they provide an artificial laboratory. In 
general, core models impose a consistency on other pieces 
of data and take an important framing role in terms of how 
other information is perceived. With the shift to DSGE mod-
els, this has become focused on theoretical consistency to 
the detriment of unmodelled empirical data that now faces 
a more difficult task of becoming salient in discussions. 
While human policymakers undoubtedly are responsible for 
monetary decisions, this article has attempted to show that 
the entire sociotechnical system must be taken into account 
when trying to understand the image of the economy that 
underpins these decisions. The conceptual creation of the 
economy does not occur in any one place—either human or 
nonhuman—but is instead intricately distributed across an 
entire assemblage. With the rise of DSGE models in cen-
tral banks since the 2000s, this thinking has been formatted 
into a particular structure that has privileged theoretical and 
internal consistency over external validity, and which has 
10 A complementary explanation is that the economic training of 
central bank policymakers led them to ignore warning signs: (Flig-
stein et al. 2014).
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involved a series of simplifying assumptions that preclude 
analysis of key economic phenomena like finance, animal 
spirits, and involuntary unemployment.
Understanding the nature of monetary policy-making 
as part of a distributed cognitive system that carries out a 
sociotechnical process of reasoning is, therefore, important 
for gaining insight into the perils and flaws of central bank 
decision-making. Models are increasingly important devices 
in these institutions, and the crisis has led to a flurry of new 
research attempting to correct the errors of earlier DSGE 
models. Yet, the basic DSGE framework remains popular, 
and relatively little critical attention has been paid to how 
models are used within the decision-making process and 
the formation of images of the economy. This paper has 
attempted to provide a first approximation of how to con-
ceive of this process and how to understand the role of mod-
els, while also illustrating how extended mind theory can 
help to understand events of political significance.
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